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Abstract
The current Internet is characterized by a growing tension
between the “core” (the Internet service providers) and the
”edge” (the operators of edge networks and distributed ap-
plications). Much of this tension concerns path visibility
and control – where traffic goes (route control), where traf-
fic comes from (path identification and filtering), and what
happened in between (monitoring and accountability). We
argue that this conflict harms both the core and the edge and
that, to resolve it, we have to expose the Autonomous Sys-
tem (AS) as a first-class Internet object. This would map the
functional structure of the Internet (the granularity at which
edge systems can observe and control their traffic) to the or-
ganizational one (a graph of ASes). We argue that providing
a well-defined interface between core and edge ASes offers
significant benefits to both of them.
1 Introduction
Today we see a growing tension in the Internet between the
ISPs and the operators of edge networks and distributed ap-
plications. On the one hand, end systems increasingly resort
to overlay networks (content distribution networks, P2P sys-
tems, etc.) to overcome perceived limitations of the current
Internet. Edge-controlled overlays are used, for example, to
provide probabilistic guarantees of bandwidth, delay, or loss;
to provide content addressing; or, in some cases, to explic-
itly “bypass ISP control” [25]. On the other hand, ISPs have
come to believe that at least some of these efforts impede
their ability to capture value from the traffic they forward.
A prime example is the ongoing debate over “net neutral-
ity.” A Google search on “Skype Verso” reveals a rich set
of commentary on the developing ISP war against “undesir-
able traffic,” defined as “network traffic that takes up large
amounts of bandwidth without generating any revenue for
the carrier, such as Skype calls” [3].
Underlying this tension is a difference of views as to what
constitutes the “service” provided by the network. The edge
believes it to be an undifferentiated best-effort service that
ships bits regardless of application or load, paid for by indi-
vidual end systems. The “middle” believes it to be an inte-
gral component of Internet applications, which should share
proportionately in the revenue these applications generate.
In these unfortunate circumstances, we argue it is impossible
to objectively define what is meant by terms like “availabil-
ity” or “service”: for example, if the network is running at
25% utilization, but blocks Skype calls, is it available?
Can ISPs regain some control over the use of their net-
works, to capture revenue by differentiating their service
and thereby provide better performance for edge-controlled
networking? This would seem preferable to the currently-
favored strategy of reacting by executing business agree-
ments with some large application providers while blocking
others, a course of action that seems likely to result in further
“walled gardens” of large content and network providers.
In this paper, we argue that a major technical obstacle to
this is the somewhat ambiguous position of the Autonomous
System (AS) in the Internet. ASes map roughly to the com-
mercial, organizational structure of the Internet: AS bound-
aries are revenue boundaries, where financial settlement oc-
curs for carrying traffic. Yet an AS does not quite manage to
be a first-class object in the Internet. To end systems, the In-
ternet is a black box, which they poke with various probing
tools in an effort to reverse-engineer its structure and localize
its failures; even when they are successful, the visibility they
get is at the level of routers, and mapping router addresses
to AS numbers is an error-prone task [24]. The antagonism
between ISPs and end systems is hardly surprising given that
the latter’s operational units (overlay networks) have almost
no way to communicate with the former’s (ASes).
Consequently, we examine a simple idea that has been im-
plicitly present or hinted to in many recent research propos-
als: to make the AS a first-class, visible Internet object. The
goal is to map the functional structure of the Internet (the
granularity at which end systems can observe and control
their traffic) to the organizational one (a graph of ASes). We
argue that providing a well-defined interface between ASes
and end systems offers significant benefits to both: ISPs can
offer functionality which is useful to the end systems, and
extract value from it.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first
examine the issues that have led to the deployment of edge-
controlled overlays today. We then present a basic AS in-
terface that addresses these issues, and discuss how it would
make life easier both for end systems and ISPs. We stay
away from implementation details, as the goal of this paper
is to put forward and motivate the idea of an explicit AS in-
terface; but we do present, before concluding, a few thoughts
on how such an interface might be implemented in a way that
does not disturb the current ISP operational model, while
leaving room for evolution in the future.
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2 Antagonisms over Path Control
A major part of networking research has traditionally cen-
tered on finding the right balance of path control between
the edge (end hosts and edge networks) and the core (the
ISPs). More specifically:
Route control mechanisms enable a sender to influence
the end-to-end path of its outgoing traffic. This was the
aim of the loose source route (LSR) IP option, however,
forwarding overheads (due to processing off the fast path)
and security concerns hindered its adoption; as a result, the
Internet evolved to be opaque to the routing preferences of
traffic sources. Recently, interest in highly-available routing
and wide-area media streaming has led to developments in
hardware-friendly source routing [12] and fast verification
of source-route compliance with ISP policy [26]. Unfortu-
nately, so far, such technical advancements have come with
little adoption incentive for ISPs, who operate their networks
on the assumption that they control the routes of the pack-
ets they forward. The response by network users has been
application-layer overlays, by which end systems form their
own P2P networks and direct their traffic through a specified
sequence of edge peers (e.g., RON [4]). In return, ISPs are
increasingly offering their own QoS contracts and treating
the corresponding traffic preferentially to overlay traffic.
Path identification and filtering mechanisms enable a re-
ceiver to control what traffic uses its resources by (i) identi-
fying the path followed by incoming traffic and (ii) filter-
ing traffic according to that path. The record route (RR)
IP option was aimed at path identification, but, sharing the
same limitations with LSR, it was rarely adopted; as a re-
sult, the Internet turned equally opaque to the ability of
receivers to identify the path followed by incoming traf-
fic. The need for highly-available services in the face of
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks has recently led to research
in hardware-friendly path identification [27,31] and comple-
mentary mechanisms for traffic filtering according to sender
or path [5, 6]. As with route control, the need to change
routers’ fast-path functionality has not been accompanied by
clear incentives for adoption by the ISPs. Users have again
turned to edge-based solutions that enable them to direct
incoming traffic through specialized filtering nodes without
ISP involvement [2]. In response, ISPs are increasingly of-
fering custom DoS-protection contracts, promising to detect
and block undesired traffic before it reaches their customers.
Path monitoring mechanisms enable a pair of end sys-
tems to assess the quality of their communication path and
potentially switch to an alternative in case of failure. Of-
fering such capabilities to end systems made little sense in
the absence of path control of outgoing traffic or path ob-
servability of incoming traffic; hence, the Internet evolved
with no official monitoring mechanism. However, failure ac-
countability (who dropped what when) is now increasingly
important not only for better provider choice, but also to as-
sign liability – recent economic analysis argues that without
verifiable service level agreements (SLAs) on the path, in-
novation and, consequently, service differentiation are im-
possible [19]. Technical proposals for domain path moni-
toring (e.g., packet obituaries [7]) face the usual criticism:
ISPs have no reason to concede such information to end sys-
tems. Unsurprisingly, researchers turn to overlay-based so-
lutions, i.e., probing between multiple communicating end
points and combining the results using network tomogra-
phy [13]. A potential ISP response (imminent, some argue)
is to render their networks opaque to end-to-end probes or
manipulate them to misreport their performance – some car-
riers already disable TTL decrementing for intra-POP links
to prevent topology discovery.
In all three cases, the antagonism is marked by the ISPs
threatening penalization at the underlay on the one hand, and
the end systems attempting to “bypass ISP control” [25] on
the other. In the next section, we attempt to answer the fol-
lowing question: Is there a mutually beneficial way in which
ISPs can be adequately enticed to cede to end systems con-
trol of where outgoing traffic goes, where incoming traffic
comes from, and where traffic gets lost or delayed?
3 ASes as First-class Objects
3.1 The Right Granularity
A common trend in all three research areas is that they
started out with a router-level view of the Internet, but are
more or less converging to an AS-level view. Consider, for
instance, route control: traditional LSR enabled a sender to
specify a sequence of routers that should forward a packet;
recent solutions enable a sender to specify a sequence of bor-
der routers [12] or domains [33]. Path identification and
filtering solutions have evolved the same way: they started
from packet marking by individual routers [27, 31] and
router-by-router propagation of filters [23], and are moving
towards marking and filtering of packets at domain bound-
aries [34].
Network-monitoring solutions have evolved the least in
this aspect. Traceroute lets a sender generate traffic in-
tended to trigger predictable ICMP responses from encoun-
tered routers, which can be aggregated to infer router or
path quality. Similarly, much monitoring research employs
black-box probing to infer router-level internal state or struc-
ture [13]. Recently, it was suggested that, if the end systems
are to receive any feedback on the state of the Internet, it
would be sufficient and practical to offer such feedback at
the granularity of an AS [7], i.e., tell which AS, not which
router, is dropping or delaying packets.
Plausible explanations of this trend exist from the point
of view of both the ISPs and the end systems. ISPs are
increasingly reluctant to allow visibility into their internal
structure and state (not to mention control over the latter) to
the outside world; the same techniques that enable probing of
their internals at router-level granularity can be used to direct
traffic to under-provisioned corners of their domain, leaving
them vulnerable to attacks and to their competitors’ market-
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ing literature. Security at least via obscurity of their internals
is a common practice that ISPs are not ready to abandon.
From the end-system point of view, router-level visi-
bility of the Internet and router-level control of end-to-
end communications, though seductive with an excess of
information, can be a scalability nightmare. For exam-
ple, a path-identification solution must solve a very differ-
ent problem when dealing with AS-granularity paths (with
their average AS Internet diameter of under 10 from about
30,000 ASes) versus dealing with router-granularity paths
(at lengths longer by an order of magnitude and hundreds
or thousands of routers per AS). Similar arguments hold for
“Internet health services” that must monitor thousands of
AS-to-AS links versus millions of router-to-router links. In
certain cases, router-level information may even be useless
to the edges: when monitoring end-to-end paths for account-
ability, what matters to them is not which particular router
dropped or delayed a packet, but which administrative entity
is responsible – perhaps liable – for the failure.
A natural design then is to map the functional structure
of the Internet (the granularity at which route control, path
identification, and monitoring can be applied) to the orga-
nizational structure of the Internet (the granularity at which
these functions are meaningful); this structure is a graph of
ASes whose vested interests push them to remain opaque.
However, the Internet was not designed this way, leading
much research (and practice) to resort to emulating this func-
tional structure by poking into ISP internals, for example,
using traceroute (a router-level solution) to figure out which
ASes are losing or delaying packets. Even when they attempt
to respect AS boundaries, such solutions make choices in the
end systems’ own terms, thereby remaining brittle and vul-
nerable to internal AS reorganizations.
We argue instead that an explicit interface exported by
ASes to end systems can resolve this conflict by giving the
end systems useful path control, while respecting ISP pri-
vacy and benefiting ISP business – experience has shown
that any solution without these two traits is bound to fail.
In particular, we suggest an interface that enables end sys-
tems to observe and control exactly what ISPs expose even
today by necessity: given a certain packet, its forwarding (or
dropping) to another AS. At that granularity, the interface
enables opaque flexibility “below” (which the ISP can ex-
ercise by changing internal technology, management, topol-
ogy, policy, or by service differentiation) while leaving room
for attracting customer choice “above.”
3.2 A Basic AS Interface
We now specify a minimal AS interface that enables end sys-
tems to monitor, forward, and filter their traffic at AS granu-
larity, while treating each AS as a black box. An AS offers
its interface via its checkpoints, a set of virtual, publicly ad-
dressable nodes that represent explicit points of observation
and control exported by the AS. At one extreme, an AS may
export a checkpoint for each of its external links with neigh-
boring ASes – essentially, providing visibility to its inter-AS
report(aggregate, attribute)
forward(aggregate,nextHop)
mark(aggregate, offset , attribute)
drop(aggregate, lastHop)
Table 1: A basic AS interface. An aggregate consists of a bit mask m
and a comparison bit field c; a packet p belongs to a certain traffic aggregate
when, viewed as a bit string, it satisfies (p BITWISE-AND m = c). The
acceptable attribute values are specified in Table 2.
links; on the other extreme, it may export a single checkpoint
that represents the entire AS as one “dimensionless” vertex
in the Internet’s topology.
To use the interface, an edge AS adds a path-control mod-
ule to its management platform, which discovers available
checkpoints, starting with a pre-configured list of those of
its immediate neighboring ASes. This module can submit
requests to the checkpoints of other ASes; upon receiving a
request, a checkpoint verifies the requester’s credentials and
potentially configures its AS’s data-path to perform the re-
quested operation – provided it is consistent with local poli-
cies. Note that the intended clients of the interface are not in-
dividual end nodes; to exercise path control, end nodes send
their requests to their local AS’s path-control module, which
performs any necessary authentication and access control,
and interacts with the checkpoints of other ASes.
Table 1 summarizes the available interface primitives; the
object of each primitive is an aggregate describing a set of
packets (see caption) and the “topic” is a traffic attribute
(from the list in Table 2). With the report primitive, a source
AS asks from a transit AS to send it information on how
an outgoing traffic aggregate is forwarded. For instance, a
source AS can ask the checkpoint of its ISP to report the
nextHop for a certain traffic aggregate, then ask the same
thing from the reported nextHop and so on, and construct,
in this manner, a checkpoint sequence that maps to the AS-
level path followed by the specified aggregate. The source
AS can then use the forward primitive to request a routing
change for the aggregate. Similarly, with the mark prim-
itive, a destination AS asks from a transit AS to mark an
incoming traffic aggregate with path information – in partic-
ular, the lastHop that forwards the aggregate to the report-
ing AS. The destination AS can then use the drop primi-
tive to ask from an AS to drop an unwanted incoming aggre-
gate. So, report reveals outgoing path information that can
be leveraged with forward , while mark reveals incoming
path information that can be leveraged with drop.
A checkpoint determines the validity of a request based on
its origin: a report or forward request is valid when coming
from the edge AS that sourced the specified traffic aggre-
gate; a mark or drop request is valid when coming from the
edge AS that received the specified traffic aggregate. Clearly,
there are other security and deployment issues – more than
we can fit in this paper; we defer such issues to future tech-
nical proposals and focus, instead, on why end systems and
ISPs would use or deploy our interface, next.
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Attribute Description Request
pktsIn Number of aggregate packets report
that entered the reporter.
pktsOut Number of aggregate packets report
that exited the reporter.
entryTime Average entry time of aggregate report
packets into the reporter.
exitTime Average exit time of aggregate report
packets from reporter.
lastHop The previous checkpoint report ,
that observed aggregate . mark
nextHop The next checkpoint to which report ,
aggregate was forwarded. mark
Table 2: The attribute values that can be specified with report or mark
requests. entryTime and exitTime represent absolute wall-clock time.
3.3 Uses and Incentives
We now discuss how the interface presented in Section 3.2
would help define and improve network availability for end
systems, while benefiting the participating ISPs.
Accountability: Today, when packets get lost or delayed,
there is no way of identifying the culprit – it could be any of
the ISPs on the path or the destination network. To compen-
sate for this lack of accountability, end-system operators typ-
ically resort to probing tools like traceroute; these treat the
Internet like a black box and poke it with different probes in
a (not always successful) effort to reverse-engineer its struc-
ture and localize its failures.
The proposed AS interface enables an alternative ap-
proach: each source AS can explicitly ask from transit ASes
to report the loss and average delay they introduce in its
traffic. Of course there are challenges in building such an
accountability framework – detecting lying ASes, prevent-
ing abuse by malicious nodes, dealing with unsynchronized
checkpoint clocks, to name a few; for a review of these chal-
lenges and a way to address them, we refer the reader to our
technical report [8].
For end systems, this approach is better than probing, be-
cause (i) it provides accurate statistics on the actual traffic
(not just probes), and (ii) reveals which ASes are accountable
for each failure without requiring any mapping from router
IP addresses to AS numbers [24]. Most importantly, it allows
each end system to define a maximum acceptable loss and
average delay per transit AS and compute each transit AS’s
availability with respect to the end-system’s own traffic ag-
gregates. A source can leverage this information to make the
best use of whatever route control it has available (through
multi-homing or overlays), and also verify whether its ISP
is honoring their SLA. A recent economic study shows that
such verifiable SLAs are the only way to ensure competition
and innovation in the Internet [19].
The benefit for ISPs is less intuitive – the first question that
comes to mind is, why would ISPs ever want to subject them-
selves to accurate evaluation? The answer is: to escape the
inaccurate and intrusive evaluation to which they are already
subjected today. Traceroute may provide less information
than end systems want, but, as far as ISPs are concerned, it
gives away too much: their router-level structure and inter-
nal routing policy. Yet ISPs cannot simply turn traceroute
off, because customers have come to expect it. If an ISP’s
routers stop responding to traceroute probes, its customers
assume that the ISP is malfunctioning; there are even reports
of customers using traceroute logs as evidence that their ISP
violated their SLA to claim compensation. The only way
out for ISPs is to offer an alternative, which provides end
systems with the information they want without exposing in-
ternal ISP structure and policy. Exporting an interface that
provides statistics at AS granularity meets both goals.
ISP-friendly route control: Today, ISPs’ ability to fetch
revenues is directly linked to their routing policies. We
do not advocate that end systems dictate or even discover
these policies; instead, we propose that ISPs expose multi-
ple (policy-compliant) options, from which end systems are
allowed to choose. E.g., Skype nodes can be divided in “sim-
ple” and “super-” nodes; the latter are nodes with public IP
addresses and enough resources to act as proxies to the sim-
ple nodes [9]. By allowing source networks to explicitly re-
quest forwarding of their Skype traffic through different next
hops, an AS can essentially deploy multiple super-nodes –
all of them routing consistently with its policies.
End systems can only win by using such a service: they
can choose highly available routes (consistent with transit-
AS policies) and reduce the route flaps and path infla-
tion associated with diverging overlay and underlay topolo-
gies [16, 29]. For ISPs, providing this service means ceding
some explicit route control to end systems; in exchange, they
avoid the implicit route control already exercised by overlays
today, which successfully bypasses ISP routing policies [28]
and defeats their ability to provision their infrastructure via
computation of traffic matrices [17].
Traceback: The basic idea behind most traceback solu-
tions is simple and elegant: each participating router marks
the packets it forwards with an identifier; the receiver of
a packet processes the sequence of identifiers and recon-
structs the path followed by the packet. The problem is the
implementation: the IP header does not provide sufficient
room for path identifiers, leading researchers to invent in-
telligent marking schemes that fit trace information in un-
used IP header fields [14, 31]. The catch is that these “com-
pressed” identifiers either do not reveal the full path fol-
lowed by each packet or distribute this information in multi-
ple packets, making path-based packet filtering impossible.
The mark primitive of Table 1 simplifies the implemen-
tation of traceback – and potentially any proposal that re-
quires marking space, like network capabilities [5, 32, 34] –
by removing the need for compression. When asked by a re-
ceiver, senders can reserve traceback space in their packets
in advance; the required size of this space can be determined
similarly to MTU size. At each transit AS, the sender’s pack-
ets are classified based on their traceback header and conse-
quently marked with path information at an appropriate off-
4
set within the scratch space. Senders that send packets to
the receiver with no space for traceback can be treated with
lower priority.
Filtering services: In response to the recent rise of denial
of service, ISPs have started to offer pro-active DoS protec-
tion: they monitor the traffic addressed to their customers
(edge networks or other ISPs) and drop suspicious traffic
before it consumes customer resources. The catch is that
ISPs cannot always tell unwanted from legitimate traffic (the
distinction can be application-specific) nor selectively block
traffic from each attack source (there can be tens or hundreds
of thousands of attack sources); under heavy attacks, their
only option may be to pull the plug on the targeted customer.
The proposed AS interface enables an alternative ap-
proach, already implied or advocated in research propos-
als [6,23]: If the path followed by unwanted traffic is known
(see Traceback paragraph above), the receiving AS can ex-
plicitly ask from the source AS that generates the unwanted
traffic (or a transit AS that carries it) to stop forwarding this
traffic. The receiving AS can then treat the (legitimate) traf-
fic from cooperating ASes preferentially, while rate-limiting
traffic from non-cooperating ASes.
There are two well known arguments for why this reac-
tive approach improves the availability of a server that is
under attack compared to pro-active ISP protection. First,
it leads to less collateral damage, because the target is in a
better position to distinguish unwanted from legitimate traf-
fic than its ISP. Second, it can handle more attack sources,
because unwanted traffic is blocked as close as possible to
its sources, where more filtering resources are available per
attack source.
The benefit for participating ISPs is also related to avail-
ability – the availability of their own service as experienced
by their customers. Given the nature of legitimate TCP
flows, which back off in the face of packet loss, rate-limiting
a mix of legitimate and attack traffic can practically drive
legitimate throughput to zero [18]. When an AS hosts mis-
behaving clients that flood, say, eBay’s link with unwanted
traffic, eBay’s network can at best rate-limit all traffic from
that AS; this essentially penalizes the AS’s legitimate clients,
which can no longer connect to eBay. However, if the AS
blocks its own misbehaving clients, then there is no reason
for eBay to rate-limit all its traffic, which means that its le-
gitimate clients maintain their connectivity to eBay through-
out the attack. So, exporting a filtering interface gives ASes
more control over their own connectivity: they can choose
whether it is worth blocking traffic from misbehaving clients,
based on how much that will benefit the connectivity of their
legitimate clients.
4 Implementation and Deployment
We have argued for an AS interface that enables end sys-
tems to explicitly request monitoring, forwarding, marking
and filtering of their traffic. The question might legitimately
be raised as to whether implementing such an interface is
practical for ISPs, particularly given the complexity involved
in the myriad of BGP policies in use today.
Nevertheless, we are optimistic that a more flexible rout-
ing platform supporting user-supplied policies is feasible,
and indeed desirable to an ISP in terms of management over-
head. Our optimism is based on recent developments in dif-
ferent areas of networking research, which point the way to
the system architecture, underlying theoretical model, and
implementation technology for such a scheme.
We first observe that the datapath part of the problem,
namely packet classification, marking or monitoring and pol-
icy routing at line rate, is largely a solved problem in mod-
ern networking hardware [1]. Moreover, recent research has
shown how to enhance the datapath with configurable line-
rate packet processing [11].
Architecturally, we favor the use of an explicit control
plane reminiscent of a routing platform [10, 30], i.e., a log-
ically centralized (though physically distributed) service ex-
porting the interface we propose to clients. This control
plane consists of the checkpoints mentioned in Section 3.2.
Theoretically, while current route control platforms tend
to focus explicitly on BGP, we believe that a routing model
based on the algebras of metarouting [15] offers a more
sound and comprehensive theoretical basis for new rout-
ing/filtering systems. More formalized models of routing
are easier to reason about automatically, and are thus more
amenable to incorporating user-supplied policies in a way
that is safe for the carrier (and verifiably so).
Finally, we argue that the implementation of such an AS
routing/filtering service would benefit greatly from the use
of declarative logic languages. Such languages have been
previously demonstrated to cover a large fraction of Inter-
net routing protocols [22] as well as overlay networks [21].
For example, a simple link-state routing protocol can be
expressed in a handful of rules and automatically trans-
lated into an executable specification that generates the same
messages that a hand-coded protocol would generate [20].
Declarativity is a time-honored tradition, especially for pol-
icy and contract specifications, where the means are un-
known or unknowable, but the ends are declared in detail.
Besides their conciseness and high-level, formal na-
ture, the relationship between logic languages and database
queries is an appealing characteristic for implementing our
black-box AS interface. Declarative routing systems treat
the set of routing tables in a network as a database view
over the distributed state of the network, also represented as
database relations. The routing process is therefore one of
distributed view maintenance, performed by evaluating con-
tinuous distributed queries. This data-centric view naturally
integrates user policy state (as well as resource discovery and
system management) in a single implementation framework.
We also observe in passing that declarative languages
point to a way to evolve the basic strawman interface we
presented in Section 3.2. In the future, we speculate that
operators will allow users to specify a much richer range of
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routing behaviors for their traffic, by accepting declarative
descriptions of such policies instead of the primitive behav-
iors we have dealt with so far. In fact, declarative languages,
especially those based on Datalog, have a fairly extensive lit-
erature on static verification of important properties of pro-
grams, including termination and convergence [20]. Further-
more, this opens up the possibility for ASes to innovate in
the functionality they offer without requiring protocol exten-
sions to be agreed in advance by all operators, as long as they
can be expressed in the language.
5 The Way Forward
As the growing pains of the Internet lead researchers to bold
revolutionary redesigns of everything and at the same time
to broad band-aids to the current proven but ailing network,
this paper proposes a step in between: the explicit though
incremental institution of an AS interface as a basic exten-
sibility and observability building block. This has the po-
tential to reconcile the need of the edge for disruptive new
services with the need for a compatible competitive playing
field among ISPs. We have argued that much of the ambi-
tious, evolutionary research on route control, filtering and
monitoring services can be accommodated by such an inter-
face and yet be amenable to plausible pricing and control
by the ISPs. We have discussed a strawman design for this
interface and a few thoughts on how to implement it.
Many interesting and important research questions open
up. First, though we have argued for declarative inter-
faces and implementations thereof, to give ISPs internal in-
dependence from their customers’ expectations, the partic-
ular choice of language can vary in terms of readability,
expressiveness, and intuitiveness. Second, small variations
in the granularity of the interface may highlight important
trade-offs: whereas a checkpoint as the building block ex-
poses multiple paths for the same AS-to-AS route, an AS
as a larger building block may be an easier and perhaps
cheaper abstraction for applications to exploit programmat-
ically. Third, it may be possible to revisit the broad results
of the OpenArch/OpenSig communities in resource reserva-
tion, isolation of routing extensions, etc., as flexible tools
towards implementing the AS interface, under the covers.
Finally, beyond our qualitative argument for the mutual ben-
efit to ISPs and the edge of a controllable AS interface, a
rigorous economic argument extending the results of [19] to
this compartmentalization would be a valuable next step.
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